Thomas Nagel, the philosopher whose 1974 paper “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?” became foundational for discussions of consciousness, says the idea that large language models might be or become conscious is “just ridiculous,” according to a Wired interview published this week.
Nagel, 89, made the comments after receiving the $1 million Berggruen Prize for Philosophy and Culture. While he told Wired he is “tremendously impressed by the lifelikeness” of current AI systems compared to earlier efforts, he rejects the philosophical position that physical substrate is irrelevant to consciousness.
The philosopher criticized what he calls a functionalist assumption among some colleagues—the idea that consciousness can emerge from any system performing certain functions, regardless of its physical makeup. “Complicated data centers have absolutely nothing in common with the physical character of a nervous system,” Nagel said. He argues that consciousness is likely linked to “physical processes and systems of certain kinds,” meaning the material basis matters.
Nagel’s original “bat” paper examined whether humans could understand the subjective experience of other beings. His current stance suggests he sees a categorical difference between biological nervous systems and artificial neural networks, regardless of their behavioral similarity.
The Berggruen Prize recognizes thinkers “whose ideas have profoundly shaped human self-understanding.” Previous winners include philosopher Peter Singer and the late Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg.